sanity in philosophy? Any philosophy that was not able to sustain these notions would have been utter nonsense to the classic philosophers. Philosophy had to be able to make for good conversation on the agora, it had to promote the critical but simultaneous pragmatic sentiments of Socratic dialogue. I regret to say that one finds very little of these notions intact in contemporary continental philosophy. With a few exceptions, one will only encounter self reflection and a seemingly deep-seated hatred of humanity -or, eventually, the "subject" -in contemporary philosophy. Not that the continental philosophers themselves had much of a choice. 20 th century Europe left them with nothing but dread and despair. But the absence of notions such as meaning, the good, happiness, healing, friendship and so on in the mainstream continental philosophy of our time, was brought home in a particularly violent fashion on September 11 th 2001. That HTS(3) 2002 dreadful day reminded the whole of Western civilization how fragile civilization itself is, rudely re-awakening our sense of the value of real life singularities such as meaning and sanity. It brought home, once again, the philosophical necessity of investigating these notions, which, for all practical consequences, have been declared obsolete by the continental prophets of extremity. If analytic philosopher Bertrand Russell's sober and streetwise philosophy could serve as a reminder of just how accessible philosophy can be, retaining its elegance amidst its own linguistic and methodological difficulties, it is perhaps time for students of continental philosophy to take stock of where their philosophy stands today with regards to real life. 4 But there is another stimulus involved in re-associating continental philosophy with real life: Being educated in the continental tradition myself, I am particularly weary of so-called "practical philosophy", a contemporary quasi-intellectualism encountered amongst all kinds of professionals, from lawyers to medical practitioners to engineers, which strive to completely de-contextualize philosophical texts and put arbitrary, rudimentary interpretations of philosophical texts forward as the basis of, for example, health management, human resources management or economic policy. An example of this populist assault on philosophy is to be found in editor E D Cohen's book, (1999) , only one of many recent publications in the dreadful, reckless field of "practical philosophy": Now, more than ever it seems, institutions of higher education are being called upon to provide students with information in the classroom that can contribute to the success of students in the workplace. With philosophers and departments of philosophy struggling to justify budgets and make ends meet, for some this is the easy way out. Unlike an authentic philosophical text, which engages in dialogue with the history of ideas, this kind of book typically contains "practice" sections written by "philosopher practitioners" who attempt 4 I hasten to add that the established opposition of continental or critical philosophy and Anglo-Saxon or analytic (or "common-sense") philosophy, an opposition which I clearly, for sake of argument, sustain here, does not seem to hold up any longer as a rule of necessity. Some critical theorists, such as Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas, have already established some renewed common grounds with analytic philosophers. Their own brands of critique of culture, grounded in notions such as "philosophical pragmatism" and "communicative action" have shown that real life is not the philosophical prerogative of the common-sense inclined. A number of analytic philosophers, on the other hand, have been promoting a more self-critical attitude towards the task and nature of philosophy itself: Russell, James and Whitehead, in particular. There seems, to my understanding, to be a growing synergy or even symbiosis between these two old intellectual traditions in Western philosophy. The platform of this symbiosis is, amongst other things, the necessity of bringing philosophy back to the people, back to real life.
Philosophers at work: Issues and practice of philosophy
to demonstrate how their knowledge of the problems, methods, and theories of philosophy provide powerful tools for addressing the dilemmas that arise in diverse work settings. Through typical "practice" sections in these kind of books, students are supposedly able to gain an understanding of the practical value of philosophy. The lack of subtlety and the superficial nature of exegesis in these textbooks for "practical philosophy" leave me breathless. "Practical philosophy" thrives on continental philosophy's obscurity, it pretends to give access to its idiosyncrasies and enlighten the obscure philosophies of Enlightenment. But in the end it gives access to a totally different discourse, something that is not philosophy by any stretch of the imagination. The quicker continental philosophy self-adjusts to real life, the quicker, one can only hope, this kind of artificial "philosophy" will go away. I want to make clear that I believe "practical philosophy" will take us nowhere and it certainly is not the kind of real life philosophy that I have in mind here.
What I do have in mind, is what is rather sometimes being referred to as applied philosophy. There has been a stream of publications 5 over the past few years in this discipline, if one could take the liberty of calling it a discipline at this early stage of its development, showing that philosophy is indeed applicable beyond the internal philosophical discourse, in a fair and justifiable manner. Philosophy, applied philosophy makes clear, does not belong to philosophers alone.
Applied philosophy, unlike "practical philosophy", certainly is a kind of philosophy; a kind that departs from the postulate that philosophy has the inherent ability to inform, guide and constrain all practice (conversely, actions divorced from theory lack perspective). It promotes philosophy both as critique and activity, thus teaming up continental and analytic notions of philosophy. The critical stance -the very process of questioning meaning -disengages us from action and may initially pitch us into a felt sense of meaninglessness. But progress, however intellectually defined, requires that 5
The young British philosopher Alain de Botton, for example, has utilised the notion of applied philosophy very well in his stylish The Consolations of Philosophy (2000) . But there are numerous other recent publications that have addressed the relation between philosophy, accessibility and actuality by appealing to the claims of applied philosophy: See, inter alia, Corey (2000) , Diamond (1999) , Kingwell (2000) , Le Bon (2001) , Marinoff (1999) , Morris (1998) , Phillips (2001) , Raabe (2000) and Schuster (1999 There is constructive potential in this kind of philosophical undertaking. It promotes both the critical and commonsense perspectives on philosophy. There is something beautifully Greek about it. It has a clear Socratic ring to it. If philosophy is to be taken seriously in contexts beyond the complex and esoteric internal philosophical discourse, this kind of applied philosophy could indeed provide one direction which could take us forward. Real life matters here. Philosophical claims and investigations are hereby shown to be taken seriously, not only by philosophers, but also by everyone occupied with meaning, sense and happiness.
One discipline that seems to be very successful in applying philosophy in this fashion is psychotherapy. An example of the way in which philosophy could be externally applied in other contexts, disciplines and frameworks of reference, is American therapist Alex Howard's finely crafted Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy Before we turn our attention to Howard's project, we need to clarify the relation between applied philosophy and philosophical counselling, as a particular form of counselling.
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING AND APPLIED PHILOS-

OPHY
Everyone seems to have a therapist today. With clerics abandoned and philosophers of the deconstructionist kind having declared themselves obsolete, therapists have become the new priests of Western civilization. Even if therapists enjoy only a fraction of the power, influence and formative abilities priests seem to have had during the heyday of the church, they would indeed be very influential in society. That is why we need to be as critical of them as we have become of priests and ministers. We need to be as cautious of them as we have become of the epistemologically violent postmodernists. And they, the therapists, should not be indifferent to, at the very least, the intellectual framework of reference their craft presupposes. This unclarity probably has to do with the fact that both these enterprises, unlike psychiatry, are essentially "talking treatments". The concept of "counselling" only seem to have appeared with Carl Rogers in the 1950's. "Counselling psychology" is another word which appeared only recently, but which is already and rapidly developing its own literature. HTS(3) 2002 presupposition about philosophical counselling, namely that philosophical counselling is or should be a hybrid of philosophy and psychology or psychotherapy. "Many people who think, speak, and write about philosophical practitioners refer to them as though they were therapists in the usual sense of the term" (Schuster 1999:2), and she devotes the first chapter of her book to oppose and distance herself from that particular notion. Schuster attempts to demonstrate that the relationship between counsellor and client is dialogical and dialectic, and not authoritative and hierarchical. The initial and theoretical part of her book contextualizes the historical setting of philosophical practice as well as contemporary philosophical practice, while she attempts to justify the non-clinical approach of her version of philosophical counselling. Schuster does not treat mental problems as illnesses and she points out that what is thought of as a problem is often only problematic by reference to a certain conception of it, imposed upon the client by others. Of the many approaches to philosophical counselling that she presents, Schuster eventually defends and supports Achenbach's understanding of philosophical counselling as an open-ended, non-definitive inquiry. The philosopher-counsellor's task is to assist the client to "think through" their situation and replace the problem with philosophical understanding.
Schuster's version of philosophical counselling is essentially dialogue, and however Schuster attempts to divert our attention away from medicine and the clinic, I am not at all convinced that their "beyond method" eventually constitutes a form of therapy.
Insight, perspective, self-understanding, intellectual balance? -yes; Therapy? -no.
Some clients or patients do need Prozac -not Plato, or Hegel, for that matter.
Counsellors like Schuster tend to forget that philosophy is a difficult discipline that requires a healthy, radically active intellect. How a mentally ill, or severely traumatized patient, will meet that requirement is never made clear. On the other hand, I can almost hear the objection being raised, philosophers such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer did some of their best work when they were themselves mentally affected. True: but making or doing philosophy in a frenzied, dionisic state of mind is one thing -getting your mental health back, something quite different. Philosophy as such is not even a particularly healthy preoccupation; I have experienced in my own life just how mentally and emotionally detrimental and destructive philosophical labour can be. In short: Schuster's version of philosophical counselling negates the fact that some patients do need medicine, pure and simple.
A more balanced view on the relationship between philosophical counselling and psychotherapy, and, eventually, philosophy and medicine, is the one sustained in P B Raabe's Philosophical Counselling: Theory and Practice (2000) . Strikingly, Raabe is critical of the abovementioned style of philosophical counselling and the "beyond method method" of Achenbach, as utilised by Schuster. Raabe's view, completely different from Schuster's, is that philosophical counselling actually has a broad overlap with psychological counselling and that this interdisciplinarity should be recognized. He shows that a number of methods of psychological counselling, such as cognitive therapy and rational motive behavior therapy, deal extensively with philosophic ideas, albeit not necessarily in an explicit fashion. Part of Raabe's task is to find something that would in proclaims that philosophers, from Pythagoras to the contemporary deconstructionists, have a lot to teach therapists about meaning, healing and wisdom in real life (Howard 2000:xii) . If therapists try to learn from philosophers, they can develop a broader, deeper vision of therapeutic talk and action and become aware of its problems and possibilities.
Howard's version of applied philosophy will, at the end, not provide final answers. But it will contribute to the understanding of a sharper, larger picture -of where we are now and how we got here. But most important, the notion that a therapist is just "listening" or just taking part in dialogue is a dangerous illusion that has much more currency than it deserves. Philosophy, through the ages, teaches us that it is impossible to "just listen".
Listening is a creative act that cannot take place without utilising the ideas, experiences and values that matter to us. Philosophy teaches us to be critical of those ideas, nuanced about those experiences and cautious of those values. It teaches therapists to listen very carefully -to be critical, in short.
In his book, Howard presents us an interpretation of more than thirty of the most influential Western philosophers who "teach therapists how to listen" (Howard 2000:xiv) .
He believes that philosophy underpins therapy as a means to healing, identity, direction and meaning (Howard 2000:xiv) . Of course, one could add, many others have much to offer on the subjects of healing and meaning: poets, painters, novelists and composers, amongst others. But philosophers seem to have the cunning ability not to give final answers. Philosophers rarely provide us with products, models or answers. They simply keep on asking questions, never accepting the first, second or third answer as the "final answer" or "model". When the music's over, the philosopher will still be around, asking questions. That is the inherent dynamics and the true value of philosophical critique.
Philosophers, therefore, provide us with an ongoing investigation into the heart of matters -into the real life that matters to us all.
Howard's survey of thinkers, from Pythagoras onwards, is well grounded. Each of the philosophies presented is shown to have far deeper implications for real life than one would have come to expect from esoteric creatures like philosophers, which brings me to the first appreciative remark on Howard's book. It is original and often delightfully surprising, for example, the way Luther, Freud and Jung is being presented as essentially philosophers, whose thinking had immediate consequences for religion and psychology.
Howard attempts to make a difference to the way in which philosophy is being perceived
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as radically esoteric and I believe he succeeds in doing that. He has a comfortable and engaging style, never disregarding the complexity of the material he entertains us with.
For example, he introduces every thinker by means of key points and a core application, before moving over to the analysis of the philosophy under discussion itself. Every analysis is being concluded with a worksheet, consisting of questions and exercises.
Apart from the conventional bibliography, useful website references is presented at the end of every chapter. Of course the cynical (and typical intra-philosophical) concern would be that Howard is not primarily a philosopher and that superficial analysis is to be expected. This is simply not the case. Actually, Howards strikes one as being a firstclass intellectual. He handles the primary texts with obvious ease, he is eloquent and he knows exactly where he is going with each chapter. He is being very selective in the way he goes about interpreting and applying the texts under discussion, but read against the background and objective of the book, this is quite understandable. This elegant kind of applied philosophy could only be the work of a skilful operator. initially have to draw upon these foundations and/or a critique of these foundations.
Psychotherapy that endeavours to apply philosophy or establish a crossover to philosophy, must, in the first instance, show itself to be a critical psychotherapy, just as any theology which draws upon philosophical reflection, would have to be a critical theology. In Schrag's own words: A psychotherapy that crosses over to philosophy must itself become a radical anthropology (Schrag 1980:57 And, importantly, he is bringing his conclusions back to real life, to the lived experience, not back to another continental concept of "human nature".
HERACLITUS AS CASE STUDY
Instead of cryptically surveying all thirty-plus philosophers being applied in this book, I
have opted for a discussion of one of the most brilliant Greek philosophers, trusting that it will serve as a sufficient stimulus to take up Howard's text yourself and explore how he 7 A critical remark though: I am not at all convinced that Howard has treated the postmodernists with the rigour and discipline they require from their students. One would have to do a lot better to discredit intellectual sentinels such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Lyotard, than presenting one sweeping, overall discrediting chapter (see Howard 2000: 356-368) . In this sense the subtitle of the book is somewhat misleading. It should rather have been titled Pythagoras to Sartre. One may be able to understand why Howard feels so uncomfortable in the company of thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze. They demolish the notion of objective truth and a grand hermeneutical masternarrative, which explains smaller or subsequent metanarratives, without any compromise. I fail to see how a modern therapeutical model would survive Foucault's Madness and Civilization, or Derrida's (1978:196-231 ) essay on Freud, for example. I believe Howard's lack of a more nuanced analysis of the postmodernists is strategic. He can't afford to take them too seriously. They will, quite possibly, bring an end to the notion of therapy itself, like they have done with the notion of rehabilitation.
applies his assembly of philosophers in the realm of psychotherapy. 8 I turn our attention to the brilliant Heraclitus.
Heraclitus' philosophical stance
Heraclitus' philosophy is well-known. His thought is initially being presented in conventional fashion as a philosophy which, essentially, departed from the notion that there is nothing at all permanent, anywhere, in the whole of existence (Howard 2000:10ff) . Everything is flux, change, process, becoming something else. Everything, therefore, is interconnected with everything else since there is no object or thing that has any permanent defined boundary keeping it separate, other and different from its surroundings. Heraclitus famously observed that one could not step into the same river twice since the river was always in process, in flow, always moving on. It is not that we move through life, life flows through us: we are not so much in the world, as of the world.
The Heraclitean view implies that "I" am not some solid essence that can be revealed via analysis and careful introspection. "I" am, rather, more like "x" in algebra, a variable more than a constant. "I" change in meaning, direction and value according to context and circumstances: and, of course, these too are ever changing. "I" am intimately intermixed with these surroundings. "I" am not just in them, "I" am of them.
Heraclitus argued that boundaries between self and world are not absolute, but fluid within one interconnected process: the river cannot be extracted from its context Howard [2000:xv] , for a somewhat lackluster explanation for their absence). At the very least, exactly in terms of the objective of the book, Simone de Beauvoir, Ayn Rand and Hannah Arendt belong in his assembly. HTS (3) 2002 since it is both the flow of the water and the context on which it sits and moves.
Likewise, "I" cannot be extracted from, analysed without, or understood independently of, my circumstances. They form and comprise me, and I form and comprise them, just as the soil on which the river flows shapes and is shaped by the movement of water.
Heraclitus and psychotherapy
Less conventional is Howard's application of these ideas to psychotherapy. The first drastic implication of Heraclitus' view for psychotherapy is that the idea that we can discover a firm, fixed, authentically solid self, becomes problematic. For Heraclitus, a person's true colours could not be known except within the stream of their own life, with their significant others, environments and routines. Knowledge of this context becomes at least as important as information gained from private confessions concerning the subject or client's inner stream of consciousness. If Heraclitus' philosophy is being accepted, the danger of exploring client agendas outside the actual stream of their life is that the activity of therapy can become somewhat "dry" (Howard 2000:11) . The therapist certainly does not get scorched or soaked by the client's circumstance because the fire and flow of their life is described and analysed, rather than actually entered and experienced. The therapist is a non-participant and thereby gains, and loses, all the insight and understanding that is available from the observer who does not directly observe anything.
Many therapists claim that one of the most important ways in which they can assist is to "be there" for the client. What they mean by this, one has to suppose, is that they are "there" in imagination only. They seek to empathise with the client and feel "with" them. But they are never in fact there with the client, as an active participant in the client's daily circumstances. Therapy is almost always confined to the therapy room.
It is a one-on-one encounter and remains both confidential and disconnected from the actual course, content and context of a person's life. This current and circumstance shapes and is shaped by the person yet the therapist never actually engages directly with it all. The therapist, therefore, never allows himself or herself to be directly shaping of, and shaped by, the particulars of the client's existence.
It is true that to be out of sight may allow some insight. It is common knowledge that continental philosophers like Schopenhauer, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger took Heraclitus' philosophy more serious than they do any other of the classical Greeks. Heraclitus was the first of many who have, over the centuries, thought that change within an underlying unity is more fundamental than solidity in diversity. Hegel, very probably, became the most important and most influential continental supporter of this view. Hegel explored the notion that this overall unity existed in a state of dynamic tension, and Heraclitus anticipated this. We may look around and see a world of divergence, opposites, conflict, fragmentation and polarity. But, according to Hegel, beneath these surfaces were principles that brought the fragments and polarities together, or better stated, revealed that everything was already an interconnected and harmonious unity. It is true that postmodern critique, from Nietzsche onwards, had catastrophic consequences for an uncritical acceptance of the Hegelian stance. Versions of Hegelian integration nevertheless provided the dominant way of looking at Self and world in the 19 th century. They then fell from prominence and in the early 20 th century we became, once again, but then under the influence of quantum mechanics, more atomistic in our conception of how the fundamentals of existence were organised.
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In summary: Heraclitus is teaching therapists and their clients that change does not imply chaos. Heraclitus thought he could see coherent principles, an underlying logos, governing an interconnected movement of existence. Heraclitus encourage us to swim in a river of change. Deeper still: you are being dissolved in the river. You are not in the river, you are of the river.
According to Howard (2000:10) , Heraclitus' views have profound importance for clients who seek insight into their identity and their relationship with their environment:
Heraclitus offers a holistic vision of self and world. By embracing, rather than resisting, change we may best survive and find inspiration. The movement and interconnection of existence may inspire awe, humility and reverence.
A Heraclitean worksheet for therapists
Questions for the client (Howard 2000:15) :
What metaphors and images do you have of yourself? Does anything come to mind or does this strike you as a strange question?
What can you think of that is fixed and unchanging about yourself?
What can you think of about yourself that has changed and/or will change?
Because of you? Because of changing circumstances?
When is it worth asking, "Who am I?". When is it best just to get on with the next task in hand? Can you think of a few examples of each?
Exercises for the therapist and/or client (Howard 2000:15) : Record and share your responses as appropriate.
